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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the decision-making process of a targeted country threatened by a terrorist group. 
This country has the choice between improving his arms or buying technologies from the border country. However, 
his resource is not unlimited. So the government has to do an arbitrage among the strategies. After determining the 
equilibrium, we analyze the impacts of each parameter.
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1. Introduction
Since the September 11th attacks, countries have tried to protect them-
selves there but the solutions are not always eective. As a result, they
undergo heavy losses. These terrorist networks are with diculty localiz-
able. The best solution or the solution of security stays the protection. The
defensive strategies are multiple. It is possible to cooperate with certain
countries in order to form an alliance and, therefore, have a common protec-
tion. Moreover, several authors analyzed the alliance within the framework
of terrorist conict: Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and Lee (1988) focused on
the phenomenon of the free riding in the alliances. Sorokin (1994) studied
the optimal strategies of a country confronted with a terrorist threat. The
country has the choice between having new weapons in order to improve the
security, or to form an alliance to benet from an outside help, or a combi-
nation of both. The alliance is not the only solution to limit the threat. The
negotiation remains an important option, in particular within the framework
of the hostage taking. This domain was the object of a precise analysis by
Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart (1987), Lapan and Sandler ( 1988), Selten
(1988), Islam and Shahin (1989), Sandler and Scott (1987), Scott (1991),
Shahin and Islam (1992) and Sandler and Enders (2002). In the continuity
of the article of Sorokin, Baumann (2009) envisaged the fact that a country
could become allied with a terrorist group. This alliance is characterized by
a ransom to pay to the terrorists in order to stop their schemes.
However, the protection is not always eective. The terrorists use more
and more cunning and undetectable means to manage their assaults. They
specialize in precise types of attack. As a consequence, the protection is
sometimes obsolete. In front of this specialization, the governments had to
react and also had to specialize in some kinds of adapted protections. The
development of technologies have had the expected eects. Even if they do
not guarantee a total neutralization, they limit strongly the consequences. It
is in this purpose that some countries joined the NATO. His purpose is to
guarantee the safety of his members. In 1994, the Partnership for the Peace
(PfP) was created. His objectives are to ease the threats, to establish a
stability and tight relations between his partners. In a will to keep the peace
in these countries, the NATO sets up the Action plan of the Partnership
against the Terrorism during the summit of Prague in 2002. His role is
to improve the safety on the borders, the cooperation and the sharing of
information. In 2004, the summit of Istanbul led to the program elaboration
of a work based on the development of new technologies. For example, France
took charge of works in the detection, the protection and the defeat of the
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
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The member countries benet from these new technologies. However, if a
country is outside the alliance, he can decide to buy a part of this technol-
ogy. It will improve the security acting on its probability to be attacked and
consequently on the probability of the border country, holder of the tech-
nology. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal value for the
protection and the quantity of technology wanted by the country.
2. Transfer Technology Model
We consider a model of optimization under constraint where a country
maximizes its utility subject to its budgetary constraint. Only the country
1 is threatened by a terrorist group k. The second country has developed
a technology allowing him to increase its protection but especially to ght
eectively against the terrorist threats. We suppose that only this country
has the resources and the necessary capacities to invest in the research. This
government is ready to send a part of its technology in exchange for a pay-
ment. We shall suppose that the cost of technological transfer is included in
this payment. This innovation can take several forms: state-of-the-art tech-
nology transfer such as detectors of nuclear weapons or simply knowledge
allowing to organize better the protection and to be able to produce much
more sophisticated weapons.
The second country has many reasons to send his technology:
 First of all, he can want to help the country 1 in the anti-terror ght.
He does not adhere to the terrorist ideology and wants to stabilize the
peace in his border countries to avoid that the threat propagates until
him.
 There is also an economic interest. Besides the fact of selling its tech-
nology, this one has probably trades with his nearby countries. Trade
in a risked zone is not at its advantage. Furthermore, investing in the
technology is expensive. Selling a part of the technology allows to make
protable this investment. Then, the cost of research will decrease.
The government has several strategies. He has the choice between having
new arms or buying some quantities of technology. His protection function
P1 does not depend only of his cost C1, but also of the bought technology.
The total technology developed by the other country is designated by T .
However, if the cost to get all this innovation is too high, he can buy a part of
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it: d is the degree of wanted technology, where 0  d  1. We suppose that
the protection function respects the hypotheses of growing and concavity
concerning his cost: P1
C1
> 0; 
2P1
C21
< 0. To the contrary, this function is
growing and convex with the technology, justifying that the technology is
necessary in the conict: P1
T
> 0; 
2P1
T 2
> 0. Indeed, lots of countries invest
nowadays in the research and the development. It improves the protection
but the cost is high. Nevertheless, the technology is an important key to
protect himself from a terrorist attack. This threat is represented by Mk.
The utility function is the dierence between the protection of the country
and the damages caused by a terrorist attack. It represents the undergone
losses if the attack succeeds. The utility of the country is given by:
U1 = Pi  Mk
The government is constrained by its budget B1, supposed positive. The unit
price to acquire a unit of technology is designated by p. Knowing that the
country will buy dT , this one will thus have to pay pdT . Consequently, the
budget for the country 1 will consist of the amount assigned to the protection
C1 and the bought technology pdT .
B1  C1 + pdT
The aim of the government is to maximize his utility under its budgetary
constraint. in order to determinate his optimal strategies :
max
C1;d
U1 = P1  Mk with respect to B1  C1 + pdT
We specify the protection function:
P1 = (1 + dT )
! C1
a; where 1  1; ! > 1 and 0 < a < 1
The parameters 1, ! and a are exogenous. 1,! and a represent the coe-
cients linked to the protection. They guarantee the previous hypothesis.
To solve this constrained maximization problem, we use the Lagrangian func-
tion:
L1(C1; T; 1) = (1 + dT )
! C1
a  Mk + 1(B1   C1   pdT ) (1)
At the equilibrium, we have the following optimal values given by the equa-
tions (2) and (3):
d =
B1   awp1
pT ( a
!
+ 1)
(2)
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C1 =
a
a+ !
(B1 + p1) (3)
From these equations, we deduct the optimal values of the other endogenous
variables:
P 1 =

p1 +B1
p( a
!
+ 1)
! 
(
a
a+ !
)(B1 + p1)
a
(4)
U1 =

p1 +B1
p( a
!
+ 1)
! 
(
a
a+ !
)(B1 + p1)
a
 Mk (5)
3. Analysis
Through the variations of the various parameters, we shall determine their
eects on the optimal strategies of the government.
3.1 Eects of sale price of the technology
If the sale price to acquire a unit of technology is higher, then the gov-
ernment will increase its spending in armament. It is due to the fact that
the bought part will decrease. Consequently, the utility will decrease also
caused by a less eective protection. Indeed, the government will have less
technology. The eects are represented in the table 1.
d C1 P

1 U

1
p - + - -
Table 1: Eects of sale price
3.2 Eects of the budget
It is obvious that an increase of the resources will improve the utility of
the government. It will be possible to him to acquire more weapons while
increasing its degree of cooperation with the other country. His protection
will be thus strengthened because he will have a more important technological
quantity.
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d C1 P

1 U

1
B1 + + + +
Table 2: Eects of the budget
3.3 Eects of the protection parameters
These coecients have the same eects on the variables of the model
[Table 3]. If one of both increases, it will improve logically the protection.
If this one becomes more and more ecient, the appeal to the technology
will make lesser, without giving up it. It will always remain necessary as
long as the protection does not allow it to neutralize the attacks. The de-
gree of acquisition of technology is weaker so giving more resources to the
government to buy more weapons. The amount resulting from the dierence
between these degrees will thus be transferred towards the cost of protection:
p(d1   d0) = +4C1
d C1 P

1 U

1
1; a - + + +
Table 3: Impacts of the protection coecients
Now, if the technology is more and more successful [Table 4], the government
will decide to have it much more to the detriment of its protection. With a
minimum of protection but a high technology, this one will be able to counter
the threat thanks to a more eective security. The coecient ! is directly
connected to the technology.
d C1 P

1 U

1
! + - + +
Table 4: Impacts of the protection parameter linked to the technology
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3.4 Impacts of the technology
The technology acts directly only on the degree of acquisition [Table 5].
Indeed, for a quantity of technology, if this one increases, then the degree will
decrease, all other things being equal, in order to keep the same quantity:
d1T 1 = d0T 0.
d C1 P

1 U

1
T - 0 0 0
Table 5: Impacts of the technology
4. Conclusion
This paper gives us preliminary results on the eects of a transfer tech-
nology on the decision-making process of a country. It is the rst step of
the analysis. The second country will have to choose its level of technology
that he wants to develop. By helping the poor country, he will be threatened
too by the terrorists. Consequently, a probability of being attacked will be
integrated in this model.
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